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Abstract
With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic,
people turned to social media to read and
to share timely information including statis-
tics, warnings, advice, and inspirational sto-
ries. Unfortunately, alongside all this useful
information, there was also a new blending of
medical and political misinformation and dis-
information, which gave rise to the first global
infodemic. While fighting this infodemic is
typically thought of in terms of factuality, the
problem is much broader as malicious content
includes not only fake news, rumors, and con-
spiracy theories, but also promotion of fake
cures, panic, racism, xenophobia, and mistrust
in the authorities, among others. This is a com-
plex problem that needs a holistic approach
combining the perspectives of journalists, fact-
checkers, policymakers, government entities,
social media platforms, and society as a whole.
Taking them into account we define an anno-
tation schema and detailed annotation instruc-
tions, which reflect these perspectives. We per-
formed initial annotations using this schema,
and our initial experiments demonstrated siz-
able improvements over the baselines. Now,
we issue a call to arms to the research commu-
nity and beyond to join the fight by supporting
our crowdsourcing annotation efforts.
1 Introduction
The year 2020 has brought along two remarkable
events: the COVID-19 pandemic, and the result-
ing first global infodemic. The latter thrives in
social media, which saw growing use as due to
lockdowns, working from home, and social dis-
tancing measures, people spend a long time on
social media, where they find and post valuable in-
formation, a big part of which is about COVID-19.
Unfortunately, amidst this rapid influx of informa-
tion, there is also a spread of disinformation and
harmful content in general, fighting which is of
utmost importance.
As the COVID-19 outbreak developed into a
pandemic, the disinformation about it followed a
similar exponential growth trajectory. The extent
and the importance of the problem soon lead to
international organizations such as the WHO and
the UN referring to it as the first global infodemic.
A number of initiatives were launched to fight
this infodemic, primarily in social media, with fo-
cus on building large collections of tweets and then
analyzing their content, source, propagators, and
spread (Leng et al., 2020; Medford et al., 2020;
Miller, 2020; Mourad et al., 2020; Shahi et al.,
2020; Vidgen et al., 2020; Yang et al., 2020).
Most of such efforts were in line with previous
work on disinformation detection, which focused
almost exclusively on the factuality aspect of the
problem while ignoring the equally important po-
tential to do harm. The COVID-19 infodemic is
even more complex, as it goes beyond spreading
fake news, rumors, and conspiracy theories, and
extends to promote fake cures, panic, racism, xeno-
phobia, and mistrust in the authorities, among oth-
ers. This is a complex problem that needs a holistic
approach combining the perspectives of journalists,
fact-checkers, policymakers, government entities,
social media platforms, and society.
Here we define a comprehensive annotation
schema that goes beyond factuality and potential
to do harm, extending to information that could be
potentially useful, e.g., for government entities to
notice or for social media to promote.
For example, information about a possible cure
for COVID-19 should get the attention of a fact-
checker, and if proven false, as in the example
in Figure 1a, it should be flagged with a warning
or even removed from the social media platform
to prevent further spread; it might also need a re-
sponse by a public health official. However, if
proven truthful it might instead be promoted in
view of the high public interest in the matter.
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Our schema further covers several categories of
good posts including such containing advice (see
Figure 1b), discussing action taken (see Figure 1c),
calling for action, discussing possible cure, or ask-
ing a question. Such posts could be useful for
journalists, policymakers, and society as a whole.
We organize the annotations with seven ques-
tions, asking whether a tweet (1) contains a veri-
fiable factual claim, (2) is likely to contain false
information, (3) is of interest to the general public,
(4) is potentially harmful to a person, a company,
a product, or society, (5) requires verification by a
fact-checker, (6) poses a specific kind of harm to so-
ciety, and (7) requires the attention of a government
entity.
Annotating so many aspects is challenging and
time-consuming. Moreover, the answer to some
of the questions is subjective, which means we re-
ally need multiple annotators per example, as we
have found in our preliminary manual annotations.
Keeping this in mind and in order to reduce the
annotation effort and to increase the quality of the
annotations, we developed a volunteer-based crowd
annotation setups based on the Micromappers plat-
form.1
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 contains our call for arms. Section 3 of-
fers a brief overview of previous work. Section 4
describes the process of data collection, the anno-
tation instructions, and the annotation platform we
use. Section 5 discusses our initial experiments and
the evaluation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes
and points to possible directions for future work.
2 Call to Arms
We invite everyone to join our crowdsourcing an-
notation efforts and to label some new tweets,
thus supporting the fight against the COVID-
19 infodemic. We will make all such annota-
tions public at https://github.com/firojalam/
COVID-19-tweets-for-check-worthiness.
As of present, we focus on English and Arabic
tweets, but we plan extensions for other languages
in the future. Here is the annotation link for En-
glish:
http://micromappers.qcri.org/project/
covid19-tweet-labelling/
And here is the annotation link for Arabic:
http://micromappers.qcri.org/project/
covid19-arabic-tweet-labelling/
1http://micromappers.qcri.org
(a) Bad cure
(b) Advice
(c) Action taken
Figure 1: Example of COVID-19 tweets.
3 Related Work
There have been a number of COVID-19 Twitter
datasets: many without labels, other using distant
supervision, and very few manually annotated.
Chen et al. (2020) built a multi-lingual dataset
of 123M tweets. Abdul-Mageed et al. (2020) col-
lected an even larger dataset, which covers more
than COVID-19. Banda et al. (2020) collected
152M curated tweets. Qazi et al. (2020) built the
GeoCoV19 dataset, consisting of 524M multilin-
gual tweets, including 491M with GPS coordinates.
There are also two Arabic datasets, again with-
out manual annotations (Alqurashi et al., 2020;
Haouari et al., 2020).
Medford et al. (2020) collected tweets matching
hashtags related to COVID-19 and then measured
the frequency of keywords related to infection pre-
vention practices, vaccination, and racial prejudice.
Cinelli et al. (2020) studied rumor amplification
in five social media platforms, including Twitter.
The rumors were labeled using distant supervision:
a rumor was defined as a post that spreads an article
from a questionable news source (using source la-
bels from Media Bias Fact Check). In contrast, we
have careful manual annotation and many labels.
Zhou et al. (2020) created the ReCOVery dataset,
which combines news articles about COVID-19
with tweets about these articles. The articles in
turn are labeled as credible vs. non-credible using
distant supervision by projecting the label from
their publishers, based on Media Bias/Fact Check.
Vidgen et al. (2020) studied COVID-19 preju-
dices against East Asians. They manually labeled a
dataset of 20K tweets into four categories: hostile,
criticism, prejudice, and neutral.
The closest work to ours is that of Song et al.
(2020), who collected a dataset of false and mis-
leading claims about COVID-19 from IFCN Poyn-
ter, which they manually annotated with ten disin-
formation categories: (1) Public authority, (2) Com-
munity spread and impact, (3) Medical advice, self-
treatments, and virus effects, (4) Prominent actors,
(5) Conspiracies, (6) Virus transmission, (7) Virus
origins and properties, (8) Public reaction, and
(9) Vaccines, medical treatments, and tests, and
(10) Cannot determine. These categories partially
overlap with ours, but ours are broader and account
for more perspectives. Moreover, we cover both
true and false claims, we focus on tweets (while
they have general claims), and we cover both En-
glish and Arabic (they only cover English).
Finally, Ding et al. (2020) have an interesting
position paper discussing the challenges in com-
bating the COVID-19 infodemic in terms of data,
tools, and ethics. Other relevant work includes re-
search on disinformation propagation (Huang and
Carley, 2020; Mourad et al., 2020; Pastor-Escuredo
and Tarazona, 2020; Shahi et al., 2020), studying
cultural, social and political entanglements (Leng
et al., 2020), and identifying disinformation cam-
paigns (Vargas et al., 2020).
See also a recent survey: (Shuja et al., 2020).
4 Annotation Setup
In this section, we first discuss the data for the
pilot annotation. Then, we present the annotation
schema that we developed after a lot of analysis
and discussion, and which we refined during the
pilot annotations.
4.1 Data for the Pilot Annotation
We collected tweets about COVID-19 in March
2020, in English and Arabic. We then selected the
most retweeted tweets for the annotation. Here are
the keywords we used:
• English: #covid19, #CoronavirusOutbreak,
#Coronavirus, #Corona, #CoronaAlert,
#CoronaOutbreak, Corona, covid-19
• Arabic: A 	KðPñ» , A 	KðPñ»#
(Corona), YK
Ym.Ì'@_ A 	KðPñ»_ ðQ
 	¯ #,
Yj. JÖÏ @_ A 	KðPñ»_ ðQ
 	¯ # (novel Coron-
avirus), A 	KðPñ»_ ðQ
 	¯ # , A 	KPñ»_ ðQ
 	¯ #
(Coronavirus), and YK
Ym.Ì'@_ A 	KðPñ»# (new
Corona)
4.2 Annotation Schema and Instructions
We designed the annotation instructions after care-
ful analysis and discussion, followed by iterative
refinement in the process of pilot annotation. Our
annotation schema is organized into seven ques-
tions about the input tweet. Below, we give a gen-
eral idea about each question; the full annotation
instructions can be found in the links in Section 2.
4.2.1 Q1: Does the tweet contain a verifiable
factual claim?
This is an objective question, and it proved very
easy to annotate. Positive examples include2 tweets
that state a definition, mention a quantity in the
present or the past, make a verifiable prediction
about the future, reference laws, procedures, and
rules of operation, discuss images or videos, and
state correlation or causation, among others.
We show the annotator the tweet text only, and
we ask her to answer the question, without check-
ing anything else. This is a Yes/No question, but
we also have a Don’t know or can’t judge answer,
which is to be used in tricky cases, e.g., when the
tweet is not in English or Arabic. If the annotator
selects Yes, then questions 2–5 are to be answered
as well; otherwise, they are skipped automatically.
2This is influenced by (Konstantinovskiy et al., 2018).
4.2.2 Q2: To what extent does the tweet
appear to contain false information?
This question asks for a subjective judgment; it
does not ask for annotating the actual factuality
of the claim in the tweet, but rather whether the
claim appears to be false. For this question (and
for all subsequent questions), we show the tweet
as it is displayed in the Twitter feed, which can re-
veal some useful additional information, e.g., a link
to an article from a reputable information source
could make the annotator more likely to believe that
the claim is true. The annotation is on a 5-point
ordinal scale as follows:
1. NO, definitely contains no false information
2. NO, probably contains no false information
3. not sure
4. YES, probably contains false information
5. YES, definitely contains false information
4.2.3 Q3: Will the tweet have an effect on or
be of interest to the general public?
Generally, claims that contain information related
to potential cures, updates on number of cases, on
measures taken by governments, or discussing ru-
mors and spreading conspiracy theories should be
of general public interest. Similarly to Q2, the
labels are defined on a 5-point ordinal scale; how-
ever, unlike Q2, this question is partially objective
(the YES/NO part) and partially subjective (the def-
initely/probably distinction).
1. NO, definitely not of interest
2. NO, probably not of interest
3. not sure
4. YES, probably of interest
5. YES, definitely of interest
4.2.4 Q4: To what extent is the tweet harmful
to the society, person(s), company(s) or
product(s)?
This question asks to identify tweets that can neg-
atively affect society as a whole, but also specific
person(s), company(s), product(s). The labels are
again on a 5-point ordinal scale, and, similarly to
Q3, this question is partially objective (YES/NO)
and partially subjective (definitely/probably).
1. NO, definitely not harmful
2. NO, probably not harmful
3. not sure
4. YES, probably harmful
5. YES, definitely harmful
4.2.5 Q5: Do you think that a professional
fact-checker should verify the claim in
the tweet?
This question asks for a subjective opinion. Yet, its
answer should be informed by the answer to ques-
tions Q2, Q3 and Q4, as a check-worthy factual
claim is probably one that is likely to be false, is of
public interest, and/or appears to be harmful. This
question has five answers like the previous three
questions, but the answers are not on an ordinal
scale; instead, they focus on the reason why there
is or is not a need to fact-check the target tweet.
A. NO, no need to check: there is no need to
fact-check the tweet, e.g., because it is not
interesting, is a joke, etc.
B. NO, too trivial to check: the tweet is worth
fact-checking, but this does not require a pro-
fessional fact-checker, i.e., a non-expert might
be able to fact-check it easily, e.g., by using
reliable sources such as the official website of
the WHO, etc. An example of such a claim is
as follows: “China has 24 times more people
than Italy...”
C. YES, not urgent: the tweet should be fact-
checked by a professional fact-checker, but
this is not urgent nor is it critical.
D. YES, very urgent: the tweet can cause immedi-
ate harm to a large number of people, and thus
it should be fact-checked as soon as possible
by a professional fact-checker.
E. not sure: the tweet does not contain enough
information to allow for a clear judgment.
4.2.6 Q6: Is the tweet harmful to the society
and why?
This is an objective question. It asks whether the
tweet is harmful to the society (unlike Q4, which
covers broader harm, e.g., to persons, companies,
and products). It further asks to categorize the
nature of the harm, if any. Similarly to Q5 (and
unlike Q4), the answers are categorical and are not
on an ordinal scale.
A. NO, not harmful: the tweet is not harmful to
the society
B. NO, joke or sarcasm: the tweet contains a joke
or expresses sarcasm
C. not sure: the content of the tweet makes it
hard to make a judgment
D. YES, panic: the tweet can cause panic, fear, or
anxiety
E. YES, xenophobic, racist, prejudices, or hate-
speech: the tweet contains a statement that
relates to xenophobia, racism, prejudices, or
hate speech
F. YES, bad cure: the tweet promotes a question-
able cure, medicine, vaccine, or prevention
procedures
G. YES, rumor, or conspiracy: the tweet spreads
rumors or conspiracy theories
H. YES, other: the tweet is harmful, but it does
not belong to any of the above categories
4.2.7 Q7: Do you think that this tweet should
get the attention of a government
entity?
This question asks for a subjective judgment (un-
like Q6 which was objective) about whether the
target tweet should get the attention of a govern-
ment entity. Similarly to Q5 and Q6, the answers
are categorical and are not on an ordinal scale.
A. NO, not interesting: the tweet is not interest-
ing for any government entity
B. not sure: the content of the tweet makes it
hard to make a judgment
C. YES, categorized as in Q6: a government en-
tity should pay attention to this tweet and
it was labeled with some of the YES sub-
categories in Q6
D. YES, other: the tweet needs the attention of a
government entity, but it cannot be labeled as
any of the above categories
E. YES, blames authorities: the tweet blames
government authorities or top politicians
F. YES, contains advice: the tweet contains ad-
vice about some COVID-19 related social, po-
litical, national, or international issues that
might be of interest to a government entity
G. YES, calls for action: the tweet states that
some government entities should take action
on a particular issue
H. YES, discusses action taken: the tweet dis-
cusses specific actions or measures taken by
governments, companies, or individuals re-
garding COVID-19
I. YES, discusses cure: the tweet discusses possi-
ble cure, vaccine or treatment for COVID-19
J. YES, asks a question: the tweet raises question
that might need an official answer
More detailed annotation instructions with exam-
ples are provided in the annotation platform, where
there is also a tutorial; see Section 2 for the links.
A notable property of our schema is that the
fine-grained labels can be easily transformed into
coarse-grained binary YES/NO labels, i.e., all no*
labels could be merged into a NO label, and all
yes* labels can become YES. Note also that some
questions (i.e., Q2, Q3, Q4) use an ordinal scale,
and can be addressed using ordinal regression.
Finally, note that even though our annotation
instructions were developed to analyze the COVID-
19 infodemic, they can be potentially adapted for
other kinds of global crises, where taking multiple
perspectives into account is desirable.
4.3 Annotation Platform
Our crowd-sourcing annotation platform is based
on MicroMappers,1 a framework that was used for
several disaster-related social media volunteer an-
notation campaigns in the past. We configured
MicroMappers to allow labeling COVID-19 tweets
in English and Arabic for all seven questions. Ini-
tially, the interface only shows the text of the tweet
and the answer options for Q1. Then, depending
on the selected answer, it dynamically shows either
Q2-Q7 or Q6-Q7. After Q1 has been answered,
it shows not just the text of the tweet, but its ac-
tual look and feel as it appears on Twitter. The
annotation instructions are quickly accessible at
any moment for the annotators to check.
Figure 2 shows an example of an English tweet,
where the answer Yes was selected for Q1, which
has resulted in displaying the tweet as it would ap-
pear in Twitter as well as showing all the remaining
questions with their associated answers.
Figure 3 shows an Arabic example, where a No
answer was selected,3 which has resulted again in
showing questions Q6 and Q7 only.
Using the annotation platform has reduced our
in-house annotation efforts significantly, cutting
the annotation time by half compared to using a
spreadsheet, and we expect similar time savings
for crowd-sourcing annotations. The platform is
collaborative in nature, and multiple annotators can
work on it simultaneously. In order to ensure the
quality of the annotations, we have configured the
platform to require five annotators per tweet.
3Note that this answer is actually wrong, as there are ver-
ifiable factual claims in the tweet. Here, it was selected for
demonstration purposes only.
Figure 2: The platform for an English tweet: a Yes answer for Q1 has shown questions Q2–Q7 and their answers.
Figure 3: The platform for an Arabic tweet: a No answer for Q1 has only shown Q6 and Q7 only. (English
translation of the Arabic text in the tweet: We must prevent the collapse of the healthcare system. The Ministry of
Public Health will cure the infected people, but the spread of the infection puts the elderly and our beloved ones in
danger. That is why we say #StayHomeForQatar, and we will succeed...)
4.4 Pilot Annotation Dataset
With an initial set of tweets collected, annotation
guidelines developed, and annotation platforms for
English and for Arabic in place, we performed
pilot annotations in order to test the platform and
to refine the annotation guidelines.
We annotated a total of 504 English and 218 Ara-
bic tweets, focusing on the most retweeted tweets
in our initial collection (see Section 4.1). Thus, in
the English dataset, we have 504 tweets for ques-
tions Q1, Q6, and Q7; however, we have 305 tweets
for questions Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5 as they are only
annotated if the answer to Q1 is Yes. In the Arabic
dataset, we have 218 tweets for Q1, Q6, and Q7,
but only 140 tweets for Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5.
We performed the annotation in three stages. In
the first stage, 2–5 annotators independently an-
notated a batch of 25-50 examples. In the second
stage, these annotators met to discuss and to try
to resolve the cases of disagreements. In the third
stage, any unresolved cases were discussed in a
meeting involving all authors of this paper.
In stages two and three, we further discussed
whether handling the problematic tweets required
adjustments or clarifications in the annotation
guidelines. In case of any such change for some
questions, we reconsidered all previous annotations
for that question in order to make sure the annota-
tions reflected the latest version of the annotation
guidelines.
In the process of annotation, we were calculat-
ing the current inter-annotator agreement. Fleiss
Kappa was generally high for objective questions,
e.g., it was over 0.9 for Q1, and around 0.5 for
Q6. For subjective and partially subjective ques-
tions, the scores ranged around 0.4 and 0.5, with
the notable exception of Q5 with 0.8. Note that
values of Kappa of 0.41–0.60, 0.61–0.80, and 0.81–
1.0 correspond to moderate, substantial and perfect
agreement, respectively (Landis and Koch, 1977).
5 Experiments and Evaluation
We performed some experiments on the pilot an-
notation dataset in order to assess to what extent it
was feasible to learn from it.
We first performed standard pre-processing of
the tweets: removing hash tags and other symbols,
and replacing URLs and usernames by special tags.
We then explored three classifiers with diverse
input representations: (i) SVM, which is word-
based, (ii) FastText (Joulin et al., 2017), which
uses context-independent word embeddings, and
(iii) BERT (Devlin et al., 2019), which produces
and uses contextualized word embeddings.
Due to the small size of the datasets, we used 10-
fold cross validation. To tune the hyper-parameters
of the models, we split each training fold into
traintrain and traindev parts, and we used the
latter for finding the best hyper-parameter values.
For the SVM model, we used TF.IDF-weighted
word n-grams, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We went beyond
unigrams to model the context. As this yielded a
large number of features, we only kept the 3,000
most frequent n-grams. We used a linear kernel.
For the FastText model, we used embeddings
both for words and for character n-grams.
For the BERT-based models, we used the imple-
mentation in Hugging Face (Wolf et al., 2019). We
fine-tuned bert-base-uncased for English
and bert-base-multilingual-uncased
for Arabic for three epochs as is common practice.
Instability was an issue, and thus we performed
ten reruns using different random seeds, and we
selected the best model based on traindev.
The evaluation results in Table 1 show that most
models outperformed the majority class baseline
by a sizable margin. The best model for English
was BERT, which is not surprising. However, for
Arabic, FastText was better; this can be attributed
to its use of character n-grams, which are useful
given the morphological complexity of Arabic.
English Arabic
Question Maj. SVM FT BERT Maj. SVM FT mBERT
Q1 45.6 64.8 72.8 87.6 50.2 72.9 74.4 88.1
Q2 42.6 41.1 44.0 48.5 27.2 43.3 47.4 42.8
Q3 43.8 41.7 48.3 57.6 38.2 49.1 83.1 27.0
Q4 19.4 41.5 35.5 41.6 31.8 56.4 54.4 43.7
Q5 21.3 37.6 37.6 50.4 22.2 57.4 77.2 59.0
Q6 52.6 50.4 53.9 57.2 61.5 68.6 79.3 40.9
Q7 49.1 58.6 57.8 54.6 64.0 69.1 75.7 66.3
Average 39.2 48.0 50.0 56.8 42.1 59.5 70.2 52.5
Table 1: Results for English and Arabic (weighted
F1). Maj. is the majority class baseline, and FT stands
for FastText. The results that improve over the majority
class baseline are shown in bold, and the best result for
each question and language is underlined.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In a bid to effectively counter the first global info-
demic related to COVID-19, we have argued for
the need for a holistic approach combining the per-
spectives of journalists, fact-checkers, policymak-
ers, government entities, social media platforms,
and society. This is because the problem is much
broader than what is typically thought of a matter
of factuality: in the context of the COVID-19 in-
fodemic, malicious content includes not only fake
news, rumors, and conspiracy theories, but also the
promotion of fake cures, panic, racism, xenophobia,
and mistrust in the authorities, among others.
Annotating so many aspects is challenging and
time-consuming. Moreover, some aspects are in-
trinsically subjective, which means we really need
multiple annotators per example, as we have found
in our preliminary manual annotations. With this
in mind and in order to reduce the annotation effort
and to increase the quality of the annotations, we
have developed a volunteer-based crowd annota-
tion setups based on the MicroMappers platform.
Now, we issue a call to arms to the research com-
munity and beyond to join the fight by supporting
our crowdsourcing annotation efforts.
In the near future, we plan to support the annota-
tion platforms with fresh tweets. We further plan
to release annotation platforms for other languages.
Last but not least, we plan regular releases of the
data obtained thanks to the crowdsourcing efforts.
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